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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The objective of this paper is to understand the financial dynamics of the airline industry by 
identifying profit cycle periods of the industry and their driving factors. 
 
Assuming that the industry profit cycles could be modeled as an undamped second-order system, 
the fundamental cycle period was identified to be 11.3 years for the U.S. airlines and 10.5 years 
for the world airlines.  Analyses of industry profits reveal that such cycle period is endogenous, 
neither deregulation nor September 11 have significantly changed it. 
 
Parametric models were developed under the hypothesis that phase lag in the system caused 
profit oscillations; and two hypotheses, lag in capacity response and lag in cost adjustment were 
studied.  A parametric model was developed by hypothesizing the delay in capacity response 
caused profit oscillations.  For this model, the system stability depends on the delay between 
aircraft orders and deliveries and the aggressiveness in airplane ordering.  Assuming industry 
profits correlated to capacity shortfall, the delay and gain were calculated and the results were 
consistent with the observed delay between world aircraft deliveries and net profits.  Since the 
gain in the model has lumped impacts of exogenous factors, exaggerated capacity response was 
observed in simulation.  This indicates capacity shortfall alone cannot fully explain the industry 
dynamics.  The model also indicates reduced delay may help to mitigate system oscillations.  
Similarly, a parametric model was developed by hypothesizing the delay in cost adjustment 
caused profit oscillations, and simulation results were consistent with industry profits.  A 
coupled model was developed to study the joint effects of capacity and cost.  Simulations 
indicated that the coupled model explained industry dynamics better than the individual capacity 
or cost models, indicating that the system behavior is driven by the joint effects of capacity 
response and cost adjustment.  A more sophisticated model including load factor and short-term 
capacity effects is proposed for future work in an effort to better understand the industry 
dynamics. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Objective 
The air transportation in the United States has experienced strong development through the 
boom-and-bust cycles, particularly since deregulation in 1978.  The financial crisis facing the 
industry in 2001~2003 has highlighted the volatility and oscillation of industry profits as a key 
issue for the stability of airline industry.  The objective of this study is to understand the 
dynamics of airline industry by identifying the fundamental cycle periods of the U.S. and world 
airlines as well as the driving factors of the system’s financial behavior. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
The air transportation system in the United States entered in a new era on October 24, 1978 
when the Airline Deregulation Act was approved.  Prior to 1978, the airline industry resembled a 
public utility; the routes each airline flew and the fares they charged were regulated by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) [1].  As the Airline Deregulation Act eliminated CAB’s authority over 
routes and domestic fares, the airline industry transformed into a market-oriented sector, driven 
by the dynamics between demand and supply. 
Deregulation has boosted the development of air transportation system.  The rapid growth 
in air transportation since deregulation has been witnessed by the growths in both traffic and 
capacity.  Figure 1-1 shows the annual traffic measured in terms of Revenue Passenger Miles 
(RPM), and the annual operating capacity in Available Seat Miles (ASM) of the U.S. airlines for 
 15
scheduled services since 1947 [2].  The data, consolidated by ATA based on DOT Form 41 data, 
reflect the activity of the major, national, and regional passenger and cargo airlines as defined by 
the U.S. Department of Transportation.  Shown by Tam and Hansman, the annual growth of 
domestic scheduled traffic of the U.S. airlines between 1978 and 2002 averaged at 11.7 million 
RPMs per year, more than doubled the average growth between 1954 and 1978 that was 5.8 
million RPMs per year [3].  Accordingly, the operating capacity of the industry grew on average 
4% per year between 1980 and 2000 (Figure 1-1). 
Annual Growth 4%
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Figure 1-1   Annual Traffic and Capacity of the U.S. Airlines of Scheduled Services [2] 
 
However, the net financial results of the industry had a significant different behavior.  The 
annual operating revenues and expenses of the U.S. major, national and regional passenger and 
cargo airlines shown in Figure 1-2 have grown with traffic, while the industry profits in Figure 1-
3 have oscillated with growing amplitude since deregulation [4].  Again, the financial data were 
consolidated by ATA based on Form 41 data.  It should be noted that data in Figure 1-2 and 1-3 
were evaluated in constant 2000 dollars to eliminate the inflation effects.  Unless otherwise 
noted, all financial data in this study is referred to 2000 dollars. 
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Figure 1-2   Annual Operating Revenues and Expenses of the U.S. Airlines of All Services [4] 
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Figure 1-3   Annual Net Profits of the U.S. Airlines of All Services [4] 
 
Figure 1-3 indicates that fundamental changes took place in the industry after deregulation.  
The industry net profits started to oscillate around zero profit after deregulation and the 
oscillation amplitude has grown over time.  In the current down cycle, the industry has lost over 
 17
23 billion dollars accumulatively in 2001, 2002 and 2003, outpacing the total earnings of the 
past.  Many airlines have suffered intense financial losses.  As of November 2004, three major 
airlines, United Airlines, US Airways and ATA Airlines, have filed bankruptcy protection, while 
several other airlines are teetering at the brink.  In contrast, the industry was profitable most of 
the time before deregulation, even in the down cycle periods (Figure 1-3). 
The above trend of growing profit oscillations after deregulation could not be simply 
explained by traffic or capacity growth.  Figure 1-4 depicts the unit profits of the U.S. airlines 
since deregulation that were derived from ATA traffic and profit data.  By normalizing the net 
profit with respect to ASM of the year, the unit profit eliminated the effect of capacity increase 
on profit growth.  Figure 1-4 shows that the amplitude of oscillating unit profits has grown over 
the cycles since deregulation.  Therefore, it is concluded that certain factors other than traffic or 
capacity volume has contributed to increasing profit oscillations. 
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Figure 1-4   Unit Net Profits of the U.S. Airlines 
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Moreover, the observation of increasing profit oscillation is not unique to the U.S. airline 
industry.  Similar behavior is seen in the world airline industry.  As the wave of liberalizing air 
transportation spreads globally, the world air traffic and capacity have grown rapidly since late 
1970s.  Figure 1-5 shows the annual traffic (RPK) and operating capacity (ASK) of the world 
airlines, which reflect the system-wide activity of scheduled passenger and cargo airlines 
operating worldwide as recorded by ICAO [5].  The annual growth rate of capacity averaged 
4.7% during the 1980s and 1990s.  On the other hand, according to ICAO records, the net profits 
of the world airlines again have oscillated with increasing amplitude over the cycles since late 
1970s, shown in Figure 1-6 [5]. 
Therefore, there is a need to study and understand the financial dynamics of the airline 
industry.  The goal of this study is to understand the dynamics of airline industry by identifying 
the fundamental cycle periods of the U.S. and world airlines as well as the driving factors of the 
system’s financial behavior. 
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Figure 1-5   Annual Traffic and Capacity of the World Airlines [5] 
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Figure 1-6   Annual Net Profits of the World Airlines [5] 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
Although the cyclical behavior in the airline industry has been widely noticed by industry 
professionals and external financial investors, limited research has been done in identifying the 
fundamental cycle period of the industry and its causes.  According to Liehr et al., one 
widespread opinion among managers and in literature was that these cycles were the response to 
the fluctuations in macro economy, i.e., gross domestic product (GDP), and were beyond the 
industry’s control [6].  Liehr et al. observed the cyclical behavior of the U.S. airlines after 
deregulation and developed a system dynamics model with the aid of statistical tools to analyze 
the cycles, with an emphasis on an individual airlines’ perspective particularly airlines’ polices 
on ordering airplanes. 
Other related research by Lyneis focused on the worldwide commercial jet aircraft and 
parts industry [7].  In the paper, the author discussed the cycles observed in aircraft orders, 
introduced a system dynamics model developed for a commercial jet aircraft manufacturer, and 
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demonstrated using the model to forecast worldwide orders of commercial jet aircraft.  Little was 
discussed regarding the profit cycles in the airline industry and its driving factors. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
The oscillating profits after deregulation in Figure 1-3 resemble an undamped second-order 
system.  It was assumed that such profit oscillation behavior of the U.S. airline industry could be 
modeled as a second-order system. A spectrum analysis was conducted in Chapter 2 to identify 
the fundamental cycle period, followed by detailed analysis on airline profits in Chapter 3 to 
assess the impact of the fundamental cycle period.  The world airline was also studied using the 
same approach. 
It is known that a system having phase lag will oscillate.  Two potential sources of phase 
lag were found through extensive data examination: (1) lag between capacity and profits and (2) 
lag between costs and profits.  The two potential lags were studied first as two separate 
hypotheses and later jointly. 
Based on the hypothesis of phase lag between capacity and profits, a parametric model of a 
second-order system driven by capacity delay was developed and analyzed in Chapter 4 and 5, 
including root locus analysis for system stability and simulations of airline industries.  Similarly, 
based on the hypothesis of phase lag between costs and profits, a parametric model of a second-
order system driven by cost delay was developed and investigated in Chapter 6. 
In Chapter 7, a coupled model was developed to assess the interactions of capacity and cost 
effects.  A more sophisticated model was proposed in Chapter 8 for future research in an effort to 
better understand the dynamics of the airline industry.  The model is based on previous results 
and includes load factor and short-term response effects.  
 21
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CHAPTER 2 
Methodology for Airline Net Profit Analysis 
 
 
This chapter presents the analytical background for the airline net profit analysis and 
identifies the fundamental cycle periods of the U.S. and world airlines via spectrum analysis. 
 
2.1 Assumption and Derivation of Airline Net Profit Model 
The profit oscillations of the U.S. airlines after deregulation resembled an undamped 
second-order system (Figure 1-3).  Therefore, a natural deduction was to model the profit cycles 
as a second-order system.  The governing equation for such a system is 
  (1) 02 2 =++ xxx nn ωξω &&&
where x(t) is the industry profit/loss, and ωn is the natural frequency of the system. 
The parameter ξ is defined as damping ratio.  Depending on the value of ξ, the solution of 
above equation will have different forms and lead to different behaviors.  The system can exhibit 
from exponential decay ( 1≥ξ ), oscillation ( 11 <<− ξ ), to exponential growth ( 1−≤ξ ); and in case 
of oscillation, the amplitude can be decreasing ( 10 << ξ ), constant ( 0=ξ ), or exponentially 
growing ( 01 <<− ξ ) [8].  The profit oscillations of the U.S. airlines after deregulation shown in 
Figure 1-3 corresponded to the last case, an undamped system with 01 ≤<− ξ .  Such a system 
oscillates at the damped frequency 21 ξωω −= nd . 
The analytical solution of equation (1) for 11 <<− ξ  has the general form  
  (2) )sin()( 0 φωξω += − teAtx dtn
where Α0, φ are determined by initial conditions. 
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Defining 
 
n
d T ξωτ
πω 1,2 −==  (3) 
Above analytical solution can be rewritten as 
 
( ) ( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
−
T
tt
Aetx
tt
02sin)(
0 πτ  (4) 
where τ is the e-folding time indicating how fast the amplitude grows, T is the fundamental cycle 
period of the system, t is the chronicle year, and t0 is the time instant the system crosses zero. 
Equation (4) specifies the general form of the airline net profit model to be analyzed in 
Chapter 3.  The methodology of estimating the parameters in above equation is discussed below.  
 
2.2 Identifying Fundamental Cycle Period of Airline Industry 
Among the four parameters, A, T, τ, and t0 in equation (4), the fundamental cycle period T 
is of most importance and needs to be identified first.  The period T characterizes the overall 
system behavior. 
Signal detection methods were used to identify the fundamental cycle period T.  Viewing 
historical airline industry profit data as a set of noisy signals containing information about the 
system characteristics, a Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) was applied to the profit data to 
identify the fundamental frequency of the system. 
Specifically, the N-point DFT was [9] 
 10)(][
1
0
2 −≤≤= ∑−
=
−
NkenxkX
N
n
N
jknπ
 (5) 
where x(n) is the data sample of annual industry profits, and N is the total number of samples.   
The relative magnitude of  in decibel was ][kX
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)][max(
][
log20][ 10dB kX
kX
kX =  (6) 
The frequency bin with respect to  was ][kX
 10][ −≤≤= NkF
N
kkf s  (7) 
where  is the sampling frequency of input data; and sF year/1=sF   because the data samples were 
annual profits, or in other words, sampled once per year.   
The frequency bin that has the largest magnitude corresponds to the most significant 
fundamental frequency in the system.  Because of limited data samples, the input data series x(n) 
was zero-padded to  in the DFT operation.  Through zero padding, the frequency bin was 
narrowed and the resolution of DFT picture (Figure 2-1 and 2-2) was improved. 
172=N
Annual profits of the U.S. airlines between 1980 and 2002 were analyzed by DFT to detect 
the fundamental frequency of the industry after deregulation.  Shown in Figure 2-1, the 
fundamental frequency of the U.S. airlines was found to be 0.0938/year.  Seen in the figure, the 
magnitude of the fundamental frequency is relatively 6dB higher than the second frequency; 
from equation (6), this means that the magnitude of the fundamental frequency is approximately 
twice of the second frequency.  The corresponding fundamental cycle period is therefore 10.7 
years, the reciprocal of the fundamental frequency. 
Similarly, the world airline industry was modeled as an undamped second-order system as 
well and annual profits of the industry between 1978 and 2002 were used to identify its 
fundamental frequency.  Shown in Figure 2-2, the fundamental frequency of the world airlines is 
0.099/year and its magnitude is relatively 6dB higher than the second frequency.  This 
fundamental frequency corresponds to a 10.1-year cycle. 
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Figure 2-1   DFT Results of the U.S. Airlines Net Profits 
 
 
Figure 2-2   DFT Results of the World Airlines Net Profits 
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2.3 Model Estimation 
Nonlinear least square regression was employed to estimate the net profit model specified 
in equation (4) from industry profit data.  The objective function was [10] 
  (8) ∑
=
−
N
i
ii xx
1
2)ˆ( Minimize
where  is the actual value of x(t) for observation i and corresponds to the industry profit in year 
i, N is the number of actual observation years, and  is the fitted or predicted value of  and 
corresponds to the value presented in equation (4) for year i. 
ix
ixˆ ix
The profit data were evaluated in constant 2000 dollars in regression and the best 
estimation was obtained through iterations.  The fundamental cycle periods identified in section 
2.2 were served as initial values of T in equation (4) for the U.S. and world airlines respectively 
to initiate the iteration and assure the solution convergence.  The regression statistics of 
parameter estimates were computed using a program developed by Arthur Jutan [11]. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Results of Airline Net Profit Analysis 
 
 
This chapter summarizes the results of the net profit analyses of the U.S. and world airlines 
using the methodology discussed in Chapter 2.  The U.S. airline industry is analyzed under three 
scenarios: before deregulation, after deregulation, and after deregulation without impacts of the 
September 11 event.  The assumptions and limitations of the net profit analysis are addressed 
following the analysis of the world airlines. 
 
3.1 U.S. Airline Industry before Deregulation 
To represent the fact that the industry was profitable most of the time before deregulation 
(Figure 1-3), the net profit model was modified below by adding an intercept to equation (4) 
 
( ) ( )
C
T
tt
Aetx
tt
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
−
02sin)(
0 πτ  (9) 
Annual net profits of the U.S. airlines between 1960 and 1979 consolidated by ATA were 
used to estimate the parameters in above equation.  The results are provided in Table 3-1 (first 
row) including corresponding regression statistics.  The correlation coefficient is 0.59.  The 
estimates of all parameters except τ are significant at 5% level of significance.  The large τ value 
implies extremely slow growth in oscillation amplitude and suggests that the exponential term in 
equation (9) can be removed by letting ∞=τ .  The model was estimated again without the 
exponential term.  The results are shown in bold in Table 3-1.   
Seen from the table, there are little changes between the two sets of estimates; the 
maximum difference between the two sets of estimates is about 4% for parameter A.  Therefore, 
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the exponential term in equation (9) can be ignored, and the ultimate net profit model for the 
U.S. airlines before deregulation is 
 ( ) 904.0
2.11
4.19572sin06.1)( +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= ttx π  (10) 
where x(t) is in billions of constant 2000 dollars. 
 
Table 3-1   Regression Results of Net Profit Analysis of the U.S. Airlines before Deregulation 
Variable A T t0 τ C 
Estimate 
-1.02 
-1.06 
11.2 
11.2 
1957.4 
1957.4 
282 
∞ 
0.899 
0.904 
Standard Error 0.519 0.865 1.05 3071 0.181 
t statistics -1.97 13.0 1857 0.092 4.95 
 
Figure 3-1 shows the best-fit model results as well as industry profits between 1960 and 
1990 for comparison. 
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Figure 3-1   Net Profit Analysis Results of the U.S. Airlines before Deregulation 
 
 30
3.2 U.S. Airline Industry after Deregulation 
ATA data of annual profits of the U.S. airlines between 1980 and 2002 were used to 
analyze the industry after deregulation.  The estimated model is provided below and the 
correlation coefficient is 0.88.  Seen from Table 3-2, the estimates of T, t0 and τ are all 
significant at 5% level of significance except the estimate of A significant at 10% level.  
 
( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= −
3.11
4.19772sin550.0)( 86.7
4.1977 tetx
t π  (11) 
where x(t) is in billions of constant 2000 dollars. 
Figure 3-2 shows the best-fit model results as well as industry profits between 1978 and 
2003 and the likely result of 2004 for comparison.  Because the study was conducted before the 
end of 2004, the annual profit of 2004 was estimated by prorating the industry profit in the first 
half of 2004 using Form 41 data [12]. 
 
Table 3-2   Regression Results of Net Profit Analysis of the U.S. Airlines after Deregulation 
Variable A T t0 τ 
Estimate -0.550 11.3 1977.4 7.86 
Standard Error 0.287 0.504 0.940 1.43 
t statistics -1.92 22.47 2104 5.48 
 
 
3.2.1 Impact of Deregulation on Profit Cyclicality 
Deregulation in 1978 had a profound influence on the U.S. airline industry.  Comparison of 
above two scenarios indicates that deregulation changed the e-folding time significantly.  The 
pre-deregulation model in equation (10) implies an infinite e-folding time, while this parameter 
becomes finite in equation (11) for post-deregulation condition.  As a result, dramatically 
different behavior was witnessed before and after deregulation.  Figure 3-1 illustrates an 
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oscillation with constant amplitude while Figure 3-2 projects the industry profit to oscillate with 
increasing amplitude.  Moreover, the order of oscillation amplitude in Figure 3-1 and 3-2 is 
different in order as well.  The amplitude of profit oscillation before deregulation in Figure 3-1 is 
approximately 1 billion dollars, much lower than the amplitude after deregulation in Figure 3-2. 
However, comparisons of the two models reveal that the fundamental cycle periods before 
and after deregulation were almost identical, approximately 11 years.  Therefore, it is concluded 
that although deregulation influenced the oscillation amplitude, it did not change the 
fundamental profit cycle period of the U.S. airline industry. 
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Figure 3-2   Net Profit Analysis Results of the U.S. Airlines after Deregulation 
 
3.2.2 Impact of September 11 on Profit Cyclicality 
The September 11 event had severely affected the air transportation system in the United 
States.  To evaluate its impact on profit cyclicality, the net profit model was estimated again in 
equation (12) using the profit data between 1980 and 2000.  The correlation coefficient is 0.83 
and the regression results are provided in Table 3-3.  The estimates of T, t0, and τ are all 
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significant at 5% level of significance except the estimate of A significant at 10% level.  The 
best-fit model results are shown in Figure 3-3 in comparison with industry profits up to 2003 
plus the likely result of 2004. 
 
( ) ( )⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= −
0.12
5.19762sin728.0)( 82.9
5.1976 tetx
t π  (12) 
where x(t) is in billions of constant 2000 dollars. 
 
Table 3-3   Regression Results of Net Profit Analysis of the U.S. Airlines after Deregulation  
with Data Only before 2001 
Variable A T t0 τ 
Estimate -0.728 12.0 1976.5 9.82 
Standard Error 0.398 0.584 0.962 2.80 
t statistics -1.83 20.6 2054 3.51 
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Figure 3-3   Net Profit Analysis Results of the U.S. Airlines after Deregulation  
with Data Only before 2001 
 
It is interesting to note that the behavior is not highly dependent on the September 11 event.  
Comparison of amplitudes in Figure 3-2 and 3-3 indicate that the event exacerbated the profit 
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oscillation.  However, close examination of Table 3-1 through 3-3 shows that the cycle period T 
of industry profits did not vary significantly. 
 
3.3 World Airline Industry 
Following the same methodology, the net profit model of the world airlines was estimated 
in equation (13).  Profit data from ICAO between 1978 and 2002, evaluated in constant 2000 
U.S. dollars, were used for analysis.  The correlation coefficient is 0.84 and the estimates are 
significant at 5% level shown in Table 3-4.  Figure 3-4 shows the best-fit model results in 
comparison with the world airlines profits between 1978 and 2003. 
 
( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= −
5.10
9.19782sin00.3)( 9.14
9.1978 tetx
t π  (13) 
where x(t) is in billions of constant 2000 dollars. 
 
Table 3-4   Regression Results of Net Profit Analysis of the World Airlines 
Variable A T t0 τ 
Estimate -3.00 10.5 1978.9 14.9 
Standard Error 1.02 0.328 0.548 4.11 
t statistics -2.95 32.1 3612 3.61 
 
3.4 Assumptions and Limitations of Airline Net Profit Model 
It is important to note that the net profit model is an extremely simple empirical model that 
does not address causality or constraints.  It is clear that future industry growth will be limited at 
some point; probably by capital investment as the industry becomes less-appealing to investors 
due to losses in the down cycle, and/or by capacity and traffic demand as the system reaches the 
limit of the national aerospace system in the up cycle.  Therefore, caution must be taken in 
applying the models to predict future system behavior and interpreting the projection results.   
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Figure 3-4   Net Profit Analysis Results of the World Airlines 
 
3.5 Summary of Airline Net Profit Analysis 
It was found that the fundamental cycle periods of the U.S. and world airlines were 11.2 
and 10.5 years respectively.  The net profit analysis of the U.S. airlines indicates that the 
fundamental cycle period of the industry is endogenous and it has existed in the system even 
before deregulation.  Deregulation did not change the fundamental cycle period of industry 
profits but had a strong influence on the oscillation amplitude.  The September 11 event 
exacerbated the industry financial status however it did not significantly change the cycle period 
either.  The simple empirical net profit model did not address causality or constraints and is 
subject to constraints in the future.  Nevertheless, the model offers insight on the profit 
cyclicality of airline industry. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Parametric Model for Capacity 
 
 
It is known that the presence of phase lag or delay in a control system tends to cause 
oscillations and make the system less stable.  Two potential sources of phase lag were observed 
through extensive data examination: (1) lag between capacity response and profits, and (2) lag 
between cost adjustment and profits.  This chapter analyzes the relationship between capacity 
and profits, and discusses a parametric model based on the capacity hypothesis.  The cost 
hypothesis will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
4.1 Data Analysis of World Commercial Jet Orders and Deliveries 
The relationship between industry profits and world commercial jet orders and deliveries is 
illustrated in Figures 4-1 through 4-4.  Figure 4-1 depicts the world commercial jet airplane 
orders and deliveries to scheduled passenger and cargo airlines operating worldwide as recorded 
by ICAO [5]; approximately a two-year time shift can be observed between aircraft orders and 
deliveries.  Figure 4-2 shows the world aircraft orders and net profits, and Figure 4-3 describes 
the relationship between world aircraft deliveries and net profits [5].  Again, the profit data are 
recorded by ICAO and they reflect the activity of scheduled passenger and cargo airlines 
worldwide.  An apparent time delay of approximately three years is observed in Figure 4-3 
between aircraft delivery peaks and profit peaks.   
The annual aircraft delivery data were further regressed with respect to annual profits and 
traffic (RPK) of several years ago to assess the average delay.  The best correlation among these 
three variables was obtained when average 3-year delay was assumed.  As shown below, the 
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delivery in year t has the best correlation with RPK and Profit three years ago, i.e., RPK and 
Profit in t-3 year.  The equation is in standard econometric form, where the t-statistics of each 
estimate is presented in the parenthesis immediately below the estimate.  The correlation 
coefficient is 0.90. 
 Deliveryt =   87   +   0.29 RPKt-3   +   0.027 Profitt-3 (14) 
                    (2.1)      (10.9)                  (5.53) 
where RPK is in billions, Profit in billions of dollars and Delivery in aircraft units.  All the 
estimates are significant at 5% level, according to the t-statistics in the parentheses.  The 
regression results are shown in Figure 4-3 for comparison. 
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Figure 4-1   World Commercial Jet Aircraft Orders and Deliveries [5] 
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Figure 4-2   World Aircraft Orders and World Airlines Net Profits [5] 
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Figure 4-3   World Aircraft Deliveries and World Airlines Net Profits [5] 
 
In addition to the delay observation, an asymmetric effect was found to exist between 
world aircraft orders and net profits.  Shown in Figure 4-4, the world annual aircraft orders are 
plotted against the profits in the prior year.  The figure shows that the aircraft orders either grow 
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with the profits when the industry is profitable or follow a flat trend otherwise.  A first-order 
approximation of this asymmetric effect indicates that the slope of aircraft orders with respect to 
prior-year profits is on average about 147 aircraft orders per year for each billion dollars of 
profits, whereas the flat trend is about 350 aircraft orders per year regardless of the magnitude of 
losses. 
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Figure 4-4   Asymmetric Effect between World Aircraft Orders and World Airlines Net Profits 
 
4.2 Capacity Hypothesis 
It is known that the presence of phase lag or delay in a control system tends to cause 
oscillations and make the system less stable.  Figure 4-5 presents a generic control system with 
phase lag that is adopted from Palm’s book [13].  The difference between the input and output is 
the error that needs to be corrected by the system; however, due to the presence of delay D, the 
correction will not act on the system (Plant G(s)) and update the output until D time later.   
Because of delay, the output of such generic system will oscillate around input and the correction 
item will oscillate around zero. 
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Figure 4-5   Block Diagram of a Generic Control System with Phase Lag  
(adopted from Palm’s book [13]) 
 
From above data analysis, approximately 3-year delay was observed between aircraft 
deliveries and industry profits.  Applying above generic control model to airline industry and 
assuming capacity as the output, the capacity hypothesis was that the phase lag in capacity 
response caused system oscillation. 
 
4.3 Parametric Model for Capacity 
A parametric model was developed based on the capacity hypothesis and the block diagram 
is shown in Figure 4-6.  Shown in the figure, the output is the capacity offered by the system that 
has units of available seat-miles (ASM).  The input of the system is the demand, which also has 
units of available seat-miles in order to match the units of capacity.  The difference between the 
demand and the capacity is capacity shortfall, which again has units of available seat-miles.  
Airlines order airplanes based on the capacity shortfall and their ordering strategies.  The control 
gain K in the model represents the overall aggressiveness in the ordering process, and has units 
of ASM ordered per year per unit ASM shortfall.  The delay D represents the lag between 
capacity shortfall and deliveries in the system and has units of years.  Assuming airlines’ pricing 
activity is based on capacity shortfall, capacity shortfall is correlated with profits through 
constant C, and the delay D also represents the lag between profits and deliveries.  Because of 
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the delay, the new deliveries will not add into the total capacity until D years later.  The closed-
loop transfer function of the capacity parametric model is 
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Figure 4-6   Block Diagram of Capacity Parametric Model 
 
4.4 Root Locus Analysis of System Stability 
Based on the closed-loop transfer function, a root-locus analysis was performed to analyze 
the stability of above parametric model and the main branch of root-locus is shown in Figure 4-7. 
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Figure 4-7   Root Locus of Capacity Parametric Model 
 
The equation for root-locus analysis is 
 01 =+
−
s
Ke Ds  (16) 
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At the critical point where the root locus crosses over the imaginary axis 
 js ω=  (17) 
Substituting s into equation (16), one obtains 
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Solving for delay D and gain K (K>0) 
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Therefore, at the critical point shown in Figure 4-7, the following relationship holds 
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where critω  is the critical frequency at which the system oscillates with constant amplitude,  
is the oscillation cycle period, and  is the critical gain corresponding to 
critT
critK critω . 
The relationship between the system stability and the values of delay and gain implied by 
the root-locust analysis is better illustrated in Figure 4-8.  The line in the figure indicates the 
boundary that maintains the system stable.  Systems on the boundary will just oscillate with 
constant amplitude and have the relationship described in equation (20).  Shown in Figure 4-7, 
the system will become unstable when its poles cross over the imaginary axis and enter into the 
right-hand side of s-plane, i.e., when critωω >  and/or .  This corresponds to the area in 
Figure 4-8 that is above the stability boundary.  Systems in this area will oscillate exponentially.  
critKK >
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The area below the stability boundary represents the stable region and corresponds to the left-
hand side of s-plane in Figure 4-7.   
Therefore, the system stability is dependent on the delay and gain values and its location on 
the map shown in Figure 4-8.  To understand the profit stability of airline industry, it is necessary 
to determine the parameters that represent the U.S. and world airlines and locate them on the 
map. 
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Figure 4-8   Relationship between System Stability and Delay/Gain Values 
 
4.5 Determining Parameters in the Capacity Parametric Model 
4.5.1 Assumptions 
In order to use profit data to determine the delay and gain values which would correspond 
to the observed oscillations, it was necessary to assume some relationship between profit and 
capacity shortfall.  A simple assumption was postulated that the aggregate industry profits are 
proportional to the capacity shortfall, as shown in Figure 4-6 
 Profit = C (Demand – Capacity) (21) 
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Such assumption implies that profit has the same characteristic equation as capacity 
shortfall that is described in equation (16), and consequently has the same oscillation frequency 
and damping ratio as capacity shortfall.  Therefore, it offers a way to determine the delay and 
gain values using the results of previous airline net profit analysis.  Specifically, the fundamental 
cycle period T and e-folding time τ found in Chapter 3 for the U.S. and world airlines were used 
to compute the delay and gain values in the following. 
 
4.5.2 Derivation 
In general, the complex conjugate poles in the root-locus can be written in the form 
 js dn ωξω ±−=  (22) 
Substituting s into equation (16), one obtains 
  (23) 
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Under above assumption, ωd and nξω  in equation (23) are determined from the e-folding 
time τ and the fundamental cycle period T according to the relationship defined in equation (3), 
that is,  Td πω 2=  and nξωτ 1−= . 
Solving for D and K for the main branch, 
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4.5.3 Parameters for the Airline Industry 
Using equation (24), the delay and gain values for the U.S. and world airlines were 
computed from the e-folding time τ and fundamental cycle period T that were estimated in 
Chapter 3 (Table 3-1, 3-2 and 3-4).  The results are summarized in Table 4-1, including the 
critical gain that is calculated with respect to delay according to equation (20).   
Seen from the table, the computed delay for the world airlines is 2.8 years.  This is 
consistent with the observed average 3-year delay between the world airlines profits and aircraft 
deliveries found in section 4.1.  This consistency indicates that capacity could influence profits.  
The gain for the world airlines is 0.73 annual ASM ordered per ASM shortfall, that is, 73% of 
capacity shortfall is fulfilled annually.  The gain is about 30% larger than the critical value, 
indicating an unstable system. 
 
Table 4-1   Delay and Gain Estimates of the U.S. and World Airlines under Capacity Hypothesis 
T τ  D K Kcrit
Airline Industry 
Year ( )shortfall ASMorder/year ASM  
World  10.5 14.9 2.8 0.73 0.56 
U.S. before Deregulation 11.2 ∞ 2.8 0.56 0.56 
U.S. after Deregulation 11.3 7.86 3.2 0.86 0.49 
 
Similarly, the computed delays for the U.S. airlines before and after deregulation are 
consistent or close to the observed average 3-year delay for world aircraft deliveries.  However, 
the gain for the U.S. airlines after deregulation is approximate twice of the critical gain, 
indicating an even-more unstable system.  In contrast, the computed gain for the U.S. airlines 
before deregulation is equal to the critical value, representing a system that oscillates with 
constant amplitude. 
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The delay and gain values determined in Table 4-1 are plotted in Figure 4-9 to illustrate the 
profit stability of the U.S. and world airlines.  Seen in the figure, the U.S. airlines before 
deregulation is located right on the stability boundary, while the U.S. airlines after deregulation 
and the world airlines all fall in the unstable region.  Moreover, the U.S. airline industry after 
deregulation is positioned further from the stability boundary than the world airlines, indicating 
it’s more unstable than the latter. 
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Figure 4-9   System Stability and Delay/Gain Values of the U.S. and World Airlines  
in Capacity Parametric Model 
 
4.6 Factors Contributing to Delay and Gain Values 
Some factors in airline operations have been identified to contribute to the delay and gain 
values in the capacity parametric model.  These factors will be further elaborated in Chapter 8 
when a more sophisticated model is proposed. 
The delay in the airline industry primarily consists of the decision time in placing orders, 
order processing time and manufacturing lead-time.  
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Seen in Figure 4-9, the gains representing the world airlines and the U.S. airlines after 
deregulation are higher than their corresponding critical values for profit stability.  Factors 
contributing to the high gains may include: 
• Optimism in total capacity projection that amplifies the capacity shortfall; 
• Collective market share perspective is greater than 100%.  The collective market share 
perspective represents the aggregate effect of individual airlines’ projections in market 
share.  For individual airlines, the management usually makes fleet plans based on market 
share and traffic projections.  It is rare for a management to make downward projections 
of its market share in certain O-D markets and/or across the entire route network of the 
company.  Consequently, the collective market share perspective in each competing O-D 
market and in total capacity could easily exceed 100%, resulting in significant industry-
level over-capacity. 
• Aggressiveness when the manufacturers pursue orders.  This can happen when a 
manufacturer offers special deals to particular airlines or markets for the sake of market 
penetration and/or the market share of the aircraft manufacturer. 
• Exogenous factors.  Because of the simplicity of the capacity model, the gain has lumped 
impacts of exogenous factors, such as, the positive impact of high GDP growth on traffic 
demand and the negative impact of economic recession and war on demand, as well as 
the influence of fuel price fluctuations on profits. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Simulations of Capacity Parametric Model 
 
 
The analytical results regarding the delay and gain values determined in Chapter 4 were put 
into the capacity parametric model for simulation.  This chapter summarizes the simulation 
results with respect to the U.S. and world airlines.  The assumption of the dependence of industry 
profits on capacity shortfall is revisited, and potential approaches to mitigate capacity 
oscillations are explored. 
 
5.1 Capacity Simulations of the U.S. Airlines 
The capacity of the U.S. airlines was simulated by running the capacity parametric model 
(Figure 4-6) with delay and gain values from the U.S. post-deregulation condition (Table 4-1).  
The input demand was assumed to grow at 4% per year, based on the average growth rate of the 
U.S. airlines since deregulation as shown in Figure 1-1.  The model was initiated with the 
industry status in 1980 in terms of profit and associated capacity shortfall, at which time the 
industry profit was near zero, implying a certain equilibrium achieved between demand and 
supply. 
Figure 5-1 shows the simulation results of demand and capacity in comparison with ATA 
capacity data.  Figure 5-2 shows the results of capacity shortfall plus industry net profits to 
illustrate the relationship between capacity shortfall and profits.  Seen from Figure 5-2, based on 
the simple capacity model, the industry was approximately 550 billion ASM under-capacity in 
1998 while approximately 1000 billion ASM over-capacity in 2003; the capacity shortfall has 
grown through the cycles.  The exponentially oscillating behavior in capacity shortfall is 
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generally consistent with industry profits.  However, the capacity simulation in Figure 5-1 over-
predicts the observed variation in capacity data.  This indicates that capacity shortfall alone is not 
sufficient to explain industry profit oscillations. 
 
Figure 5-1   Simulation of Demand and Capacity of the U.S. Airlines 
 
Under
Capacity
Over
Capacity
 
Figure 5-2   Simulation of Capacity Shortfall of the U.S. Airlines and Net Profit Data 
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5.2 Revisiting the Assumption – Cost of Adding Capacity  
Aggregate industry profits were assumed dependent on capacity shortfall as 
 (equation (21) in Chapter 4, repeated here for convenience) in order 
to determine the delay and gain values in the capacity model.  If the behavior were solely due to 
capacity shortfall, constant C in above equation would have the implication of cost or incentive 
for adding or removing additional capacity.  Based on the model results in Figure 5-2, constant C 
was estimated by regressing the profit data with respect to capacity shortfall via least-square.  
The value of constant C was found to be approximate 1 cent (2000$) per ASM in capacity 
shortfall, implying that the cost or incentive for adding or removing one available seat-mile to 
fulfill the capacity shortfall will lead to approximately one cent (2000$) in profit or loss.  Such 
estimation is preliminary given the simplicity of the model; however, it illustrates the potential 
interaction between capacity and profit. 
Capacity)C(DeamndProfit −=
 
5.3 Capacity Simulations of the World Airlines  
The capacity of the world airlines was also simulated by similarly setting the delay and 
gain in the model to the values for the world airlines provided in Table 4-1.  The demand growth 
rate was set to 4.7%, the average worldwide growth rate (Figure 1-5).  The model was initiated 
with the industry status in 1980 in terms of profit and associated capacity shortfall. 
Simulation results of demand and capacity of the world airlines are shown in Figure 5-3 in 
comparison with ICAO capacity data.  The model also simulates the aircraft orders in terms of 
ASM, as shown in the block diagram (Figure 4-6).  In order to compare the results with actual 
order data, the simulated aircraft orders in ASM were converted to aircraft unit orders by 
dividing the average aircraft utility.  The average aircraft utility of the U.S. airlines, that was 190 
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million ASM per aircraft per year as discussed in Appendix A, was used in the conversion.  The 
converted order simulations are shown in Figure 5-4, in comparison with the world aircraft order 
data from ICAO and the baseline order that was 350 aircraft per year as shown in Figure 4-4. 
 
Figure 5-3   Simulation of Demand and Capacity of the World Airlines 
 
 
Figure 5-4   Converted Order Simulation Results of the World Airlines 
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Again, the capacity simulation in Figure 5-3 over-predicts the observed variation in 
capacity data.  Seen from Figure 5-4, the simulation of orders is generally consistent with world 
aircraft orders.  There is a positive offset that the model does not represent and it is consistent 
with the asymmetric effect between profitability and aircraft orders shown in Figure 4-4.  This 
nonlinear asymmetric effect was not included in the capacity model for simplicity reason.  Such 
effect should not be ignored and is included in a more sophisticated model proposed in Chapter 8 
in order to better model the dynamics of airline industry. 
Therefore, given the simplicity of the model, it is concluded that the capacity model 
captures some system behavior.  The capacity hypothesis appears valid and capacity response 
appears to be one potential driving factor of the system behavior.  However, simulations indicate 
that capacity shortfall alone is not sufficient to explain the industry dynamics.  There is a need to 
look at other factors such as cost effects, as to be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
5.4 Mitigating System Oscillations 
Assuming the system stability can be modeled by the simple capacity model, the capacity 
parametric model was used to explore potential ways to mitigate instability.  The stability 
relationship shown in Figure 4-8 suggests that the system could be stabilized by reducing its 
delay and gain below the stability boundary.  
As an illustration, simulations were performed with different delays while holding the gains 
unchanged.  Figure 5-5 depicts the simulation results with respect to the U.S. airlines for 
different delay values.  Given the condition that the gain is held unchanged, the capacity of the 
U.S. airlines would become stabilized if the delay were reduced from 3.2 years to 1.8 years.  
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Similarly, the world capacity would stabilize if the delay were reduced from 2.8 year to 2.2 
years, shown in Figure 5-6. 
 
Figure 5-5   Mitigating Capacity Oscillations of the U.S. Airlines 
 
 
Figure 5-6   Mitigating Capacity Oscillations of the World Airlines 
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5.5 Summary of Capacity Parametric Model 
By hypothesizing the lag in capacity response caused system oscillation, the model 
identified capacity response as one potential driving factor of the system behavior.  For this 
model, the system stability depends on the delay between aircraft orders and deliveries and the 
aggressiveness in airplane ordering.  Assuming industry profits correlated to capacity shortfall, 
the delay and gain were calculated and the results were consistent with the observed delay 
between world aircraft deliveries and net profits.  Since the gain in the model has lumped 
impacts of exogenous factors, exaggerated capacity response was observed in simulation.  This 
indicates capacity shortfall alone cannot fully explain the industry dynamics and there is a need 
to look at other factors such as cost effects.  The model also indicates reduced delay may help to 
mitigate system oscillations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Parametric Model for Cost 
 
 
This chapter develops a parametric model based on the cost hypothesis and summarizes 
corresponding analytical and simulation results. 
 
6.1 Cost Hypothesis 
Figure 6-1 depicts RASM and CASM of the U.S. major and national passenger carriers 
recorded by DOT and ATA [12, 14].  RASM is the passenger revenue per ASM of the major and 
national passenger carriers recorded by DOT [12].  CASM, defined as the operating expense per 
ASM that has been adjusted with respect to passenger services in this study, is based on ATA 
Airline Cost Index [14].  The methodology of cost adjustment is provided in Appendix B in 
which the cost structure of the U.S. major and national passenger carriers is analyzed.  Both 
RASM and CASM are evaluated in constant 2000 dollars.  According to the DOT classification, 
majors are the carriers whose annual operating revenues are more than 1 billion dollars; and the 
nationals are those with revenues between 100 million and 1 billion dollars.   
Seen from Figure 6-1, RASM and CASM have both decreased and fluctuated since 
deregulation.  RASM has decreased on average 1.7% per year between 1980 and 2000, while 
CASM has decreased at 2% annually.  The fluctuation in RASM was followed by the fluctuation 
in CASM with about one year delay.  RASM dropped significantly by about 1.3 cent or 14% in 
2001 because of the industry crisis in 2001.  Correspondingly, CASM dropped by 1 cent or 10% 
in 2003 from 2001 level. 
 57
68
10
12
14
16
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
20
00
 c
en
ts
 p
er
 A
S
M
RASM
Average Decrease 1.7 % CASM
Average
Decrease 2%
 
Figure 6-1   RASM and CASM of the U.S. Major and National Passenger Carriers [12, 14] 
 
Figure 6-2 shows the unit operating expenses and unit net profits of all U.S. airlines after 
deregulation that were based on ATA data [2, 4].  Comparing to Figure 6-1, an apparent delay of 
approximately three years is observed between the peaks of unit operating expenses and the 
peaks of unit net profits as well as between the troughs of these two variables. 
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Figure 6-2   Unit Operating Expenses and Unit Net Profits of the U.S. Airlines 
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It is known that a system having phase lag will oscillate.  Applying the generic control 
model with phase lag shown in Figure 4-5 to airline industry again, the cost hypothesis was that 
the phase lag between cost adjustment and profits caused system oscillation. 
 
6.2 Parametric Model for Cost 
A parametric model was developed based on the cost delay hypothesis and the block 
diagram is shown in Figure 6-3.  As concluded in Appendix B, CASM is split into two 
components: CASM1 and CASM2; where CASM2 represents the profit-sensitive component of 
CASM, and CASM1 is less sensitive to profits.  The system has two inputs: RASM and CASM1; 
both having long-term decreasing trends shown in Figure 6-1.  The difference between RASM 
and CASM gives the output – profit per ASM (PASM).  Based on PASM, cost adjustment is 
made due to labor contract negotiation, the competition need, etc.  However, due to the presence 
of delays in the system such as contract negotiation time, such cost adjustment will not take 
effect immediately but D years later.  The control gain K in the model represents the effect of 
PASM on cost adjustment and has the units of cent/ASM cost adjustment per year per unit 
cent/ASM profit.  The closed-loop transfer function with respect to RASM is 
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Figure 6-3   Block Diagram of Cost Parametric Model 
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Following the approach developed in Chapters 2 through 4, the parameters in the cost 
parametric model were determined below. 
 
6.3 Unit Net Profit Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the unit net profits of the U.S. airlines after deregulation shown 
in Figure 1-4 resembled an undamped second-order system.  Therefore, the oscillation of unit net 
profits was again modeled as a second-order system, and an analysis on unit net profits was 
conducted.  Equation (4), also provide below for convenience, specified the unit net profit model 
to be analyzed. 
 
( ) ( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
−
T
tt
Aetx
tt
02sin)(
0 πτ  (26) 
where x(t) is the unit net profit or loss, τ is the e-folding time, T is the fundamental cycle period 
of the system, t is the chronicle year, and t0 is the time instant the system crosses zero. 
Following the procedure introduced in Chapters 2 and 3, the model in equation (26) was 
estimated via nonlinear least square regression and the best estimation was obtained through 
iterations.  Unit net profits of the U.S. airlines between 1980 and 2002 were used to identify the 
fundamental cycle period and the finding was used as the initial value of T to assure the iteration 
convergence.  Unit net profits were regressed to estimate the unit net profit model for the U.S. 
airlines after deregulation 
 
( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= −
2.11
6.19772sin110.0)( 78.9
6.1977 tetx
t π  (27) 
where x(t) is in cent/ASM (2000$).  The correlation coefficient is 0.85.  Figure 6-4 shows the 
best-fit model results as well as industry unit net profits up to 2003 for comparison. 
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Figure 6-4   Unit Net Profit Analysis Results of the U.S. Airlines 
 
6.4 Determining Parameters in the Cost Parametric Model 
Based on the transfer function in equation (25), the equation for root-locus analysis is 
 01 =+
−
s
Ke Ds  (28) 
The above equation is the same as the root-locus equation (16) for the capacity parametric 
model in section 4.4.  Therefore, the derivation developed in sections 4.4 and 4.5 are applicable 
to the cost parametric model.  Specifically, equation (24) was used again to calculate the delay 
and gain values in the cost parametric model.  The results are summarized in Table 6-1 and 
plotted in Figure 6-5 to locate the system.  Figure 6-5 shows that the U.S. airline industry post-
deregulation again falls in the unstable region. 
 
Table 6-1   Delay and Gain Estimates of the U.S. Airlines under Cost Hypothesis 
T τ D K Kcrit
Airline Industry 
Year ( )profit Cent/ASMcost/year Cent/ASM  
U.S. after Deregulation 11.2 9.78 3.1 0.78 0.50 
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Oscillating System
KcritDcrit = π/2
Unstable System
Exponential oscillation
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U.S. Airlines
after deregulation
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Figure 6-5   System Stability and Delay/Gain Values of the U.S. Airlines  
in Cost Parametric Model 
 
6.5 Simulation Results 
Simulations of the cost parametric model were carried out by running the model with the 
delay and gain values determined above.   
For a first simulation, the inputs RASM and CASM1 were assumed to decrease at 1.7% 
and 2% per year respectively, based on the average RASM and CASM trends shown in Figure 6-
1.  The model was initiated with the industry RASM and CASM status in 1980.  According to 
the analysis results in Appendix B, approximately 4% of CASM was used as the initial value of 
CASM2 and the remaining 96% as the initial value of CASM1.  The model was then calibrated 
to best-fit unit net profits of the U.S. airlines between 1980 and 2000, and the calibrated 
distribution of CASM is 7% for the initial value of CASM2 and 93% for that of CASM1.  
Calibration results of RASM and CASM are shown in Figure 6-6, in comparison with 
RASM and CASM data of the U.S. airlines by ATA.  Figure 6-7 shows the calibration results of 
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PASM, in comparison with unit net profit data by ATA.  Seen from Figure 6-7, the exponentially 
oscillating behavior in PASM is consistent with industry unit net profits. 
 
Figure 6-6   Cost/ASM Simulation of the U.S. Airlines 
 
 
Figure 6-7   Profit/ASM Simulation of the U.S. Airlines 
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Figure 6-8 and 6-9 summarize another simulation, in which, RASM was further subject to a 
14% step decrease in 2001 to simulate the industry crisis in 2001 (section 6.1).  Seen from Figure 
6-9, the exponentially oscillating behavior in PASM is consistent with industry unit net profits. 
 
Figure 6-8   Cost/ASM Simulation of the U.S. Airlines with Step RASM Decrease in 2001 
 
 
Figure 6-9   Profit/ASM Simulation of the U.S. Airlines with Step RASM Decrease in 2001 
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6.6 Summary of Cost Parametric Model 
It was found that unit profit stability could be modeled by simple cost model.  The cost 
hypothesis hypothesizing the lag between cost adjustment and profit caused system oscillation 
appears valid.  The delay and gain values in the cost model indicate the U.S. airline industry is 
unstable in terms of exponential oscillation, consistent with the observations and discussions in 
Chapter 3.  Given the simplicity of the model, simulation results showed that the model captures 
the system behavior reasonably good.  The model identified cost adjustment as another potential 
driving factor of the system behavior, in addition to the capacity factor identified in Chapters 4 
and 5. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Coupling Capacity and Cost Effects 
 
 
Capacity response and cost adjustment were both identified as potential driving factors of 
the industry profit cyclicality in Chapters 4 through 6.  This chapter discusses a coupled model 
that combines both capacity and cost factors based on previous modeling results. 
 
7.1 Coupled Model Combining Capacity and Cost Effects 
The coupled model that combines capacity and cost effects is shown in Figure 7-1.  The 
coupled model was formed by joining the capacity model in Chapter 4 and the cost model in 
Chapter 6. 
The output of the model is the total profit, which is the product of capacity and unit profit 
(PASM); therefore, it combines both capacity and cost effects.  The capacity and cost effects are 
coupled in the model through two feedbacks from the profit: one fed to the order aggressiveness 
K1 and the other fed to CASM2. 
First, the total profit is assumed to have an impact on aircraft orders.  This impact is seen 
from the relationship between the world airlines profits and aircraft orders shown in Figure 4-4.  
Based on profitability, airlines could be aggressive or prudent when placing orders.  Therefore, 
seen in Figure 7-1, a feedback is added by feeding the total profit to orders through gain K2 after 
delay D2, where D2 represents the time delay between the profits and the orders driven by the 
profits.  Consequently, K1 represents the overall aggressiveness in ordering process, and has the 
following relationship at time instant t 
  (29) )D-Profit(tKKtK 2∗+= 201 )(
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where gain K0 is the baseline order aggressiveness, and K2 is the order aggressiveness due to 
profitability.  K0 and K1 have the units of ASM ordered per year per unit ASM shortfall, while K2 
has the units of ASM ordered per year per ASM shortfall per each billion dollars of profit.  The 
total order is based on capacity shortfall and gain K1
 ( )()()()( 1 tCapacitytDemandtKtOrder )−∗=  (30) 
Therefore, the added link introduces cost effects into capacity planning. 
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Figure 7-1   Block Diagram of Coupled Model Combining Capacity and Cost Effects 
 
Second, unlike the feedback in the cost model (Figure 6-3) that only feeds PASM back to 
CASM, gain K3 in the model interprets the effect of the total profit on CASM2 adjustment and 
has the units of cent/ASM cost adjustment per year per billion dollars of profit.  Again, delay D3 
exists between profit and cost adjustment.   
  (31) ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∗=
∗=
)Capacity(tPASM(t) Profit(t)
)D-Profit(tKtAdjustmentCost 33)(
Therefore, this feedback feeds capacity effects into unit cost adjustment. 
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Since the model couples two different factors, capacity and cost, caution must be taken 
regarding the units of variables and parameters in the model.  Table 7-1 summarizes the 
descriptions and units of variables and parameters in the coupled model. 
 
Table 7-1   Summary of Variables and Parameters in the Coupled Model 
Variable Description Unit 
Capacity Output of capacity loop Billion ASM 
Demand Input of traffic volume Billion ASM 
Capacity Shortfall Demand – Capacity Billion ASM 
Order New capacity to be added to the fleet Billion ASM per year 
Delivery New capacity that becomes available Billion ASM per year 
RASM Revenue per ASM Cent/ASM 
CASM Cost per ASM Cent/ASM 
CASM1 Component of CASM that is less profit-sensitive Cent/ASM 
CASM2 Profit-sensitive component of CASM Cent/ASM 
PASM Profit per ASM, RASM – CASM Cent/ASM 
Profit Model output, PASM*Capacity/(100 cent/$) 2000 Billion $ 
D1 Delay between orders and deliveries Year 
D2 Delay between profits and profit-driven orders Year 
D3 Delay between profits and cost adjustment Year 
K0 Baseline order aggressiveness shortall ASM
order/year ASM  
K1 Overall order aggressiveness shortall ASM
order/year ASM  
K2 Order aggressiveness due to profitability profit $Billion shortallASM
order/year ASM  
K3 Effect of total profits on cost adjustment profit $Billion 
cost/year Cent/ASM  
 
7.2 Parameter Values in the Coupled Model 
The parameter values in the coupled model were determined by calibrating the model with 
respect to the historical capacity, profit, PASM and CASM data between 1980 and 2000.  The 
input setup used in the individual capacity and cost models, such as the initial values for RASM, 
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CASM1 and CASM2, were used in the coupled model.  The parameter values determined in 
Chapters 4 and 6 provided initial estimates for the gain and delay values in the coupled model 
wherever possible.   
The 3.2-year delay determined in the capacity model (Table 4-1) represents the total delay 
between profits and deliveries, i.e., D1 plus D2.  Assuming approximate 1-year delay between 
profits and ordering actions for D2, the initial estimate for D1 was 2.2 years.  The initial estimate 
of D3 was 3.1-year, the delay determined in the cost model (Table 6-1). 
The gain for the U.S. airlines after deregulation in the capacity model (Table 4-1) was used 
as the initial value of K0 in calibration.  Assuming no profit impact on orders at the beginning, 
the initial value of K2 was zero.  Examination of cost and profit data of the U.S. airlines did not 
indicate possible K3 value.  Despite of the difference in units, the gain value in the cost model 
(Table 6-1) was used as the initial value of K3. 
The calibration effort was first set off to find the possible K3 value by matching CASM and 
PASM simulations with CASM and PASM data by ATA respectively.  The initial estimate of K3 
was found too large that non-reasonable CASM and PASM results such as negative CASM were 
generated.  As K3 reduced, CASM and PASM simulations became reasonable and approached to 
ATA data set.  Good matches between CASM and PASM simulations and corresponding ATA 
data were found when K3 was around 0.10. 
Second, setting K3 to 0.10, calibration efforts were made to find K2 by matching the 
capacity and profit simulations with ATA capacity and profit data.  Simulations indicated that 
the initial estimate of zero K2 was reasonable and large K2 generated impossible results such as 
negative capacity.  Slightly increasing K2 improved the match in capacity and possible K2 value 
was found in the range (0.03, 0.1). 
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During the process of narrowing the range of K2, K0 was allowed to change in order to find 
the potential optimal set of K0 and K2 to match ATA capacity and profit data.  The range for K0 is 
(0, 1.2), with the initial estimate being the gain in the capacity model that was 0.86 (Table 4-1).  
Again, it was found that large K0 generated impossible results such as negative capacity, while 
small K0 was not able to generate enough corrections to keep up capacity with demand growth.  
The range for possible K0 was found in (0.4, 1.0). 
Having found the ranges of gain values, the delays were allowed to change individually.  
However, the range of possible delay values should be limited because the delays cannot be zero 
or extremely long.  Consequently, D1 was varied in (1, 4) years, D3 in (1, 4) years, and D2 in (1, 
3) years, with the objective to match ATA CASM, capacity and profit data. 
Last, parameters were optimized in the objective to minimize the sum of square errors with 
respect to ATA capacity, CASM and profit data, subject to the constraint that K1 (equation (29)) 
was non-negative during the time frame.  It was found that D2 values between 1 year and 2 years 
had almost identical values for objective function.  Therefore, the optimal value for D2 is 
between 1 and 2 years.  The parameter set obtained through calibration is provided in Table 7-2. 
 
Table 7-2   Calibration Results of Parameters in the Coupled Model 
Parameter Description Value 
D1 Delay between orders and deliveries 2.2      year 
D2 Delay between total profits and profit-driven orders 1         year 
D3 Delay between total profits and cost adjustment 3.1      year 
K0 Baseline order aggressiveness 0.86   shortall ASM
order/year ASM
 
K2 Order aggressiveness due to profitability 0.05   profit $Billion shortall ASM
order/year ASM
 
K3 Effect of total profits on cost adjustment 0.11   profit $Billion 
cost/year Cent/ASM  
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7.3 Simulation Results 
7.3.1 Simulation 1 – Calibration Simulation 
Simulation 1, abbreviated as Sim1, is the calibration simulation, in which, the parameters 
were set to the values shown in Table 7-2.  The input setup used in the individual capacity and 
cost models, such as the initial values for RASM, CASM1 and CASM2, were used in the 
coupled model.  Sim1 assumed the demand grew at 4%, RASM decreased at 1.7%, and CASM1 
decreased at 2%, based on the average trends of the U.S. airlines after deregulation (Figures 1-1 
and 6-1).   
Figure 7-2 shows the simulation results of demand and capacity against industry capacity 
data by ATA.  Figure 7-3 shows the simulation results of the U.S. fleet against Form 41 fleet 
data.  The U.S. fleet simulation was obtained by dividing the capacity by the average aircraft 
utility of the U.S. airlines (190 million ASM per aircraft per year as discussed in Appendix A).  
Figure 7-4 plots the simulation results of RASM and CASM, in comparison with RASM and 
CASM data by ATA, and Figure 7-5 shows the profit simulation and industry profits by ATA. 
As can be seen from the figures, the coupled model interprets the industry dynamics 
reasonably good in terms of capacity trend, fleet size, CASM, and profit.  The coupled model 
captures the industry trends in capacity, cost and profit simultaneously, better than individual 
capacity or cost models that only reflects system oscillations in industry profits.  The simulation 
results agree with the historical data up to 2000, indicating that coupling capacity and cost effects 
better explains the system behavior. 
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Figure 7-2   Capacity Simulation of Coupled Model in Simulation 1 
 
 
Figure 7-3   Fleet Simulation of Coupled Model in Simulation 1 
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Figure 7-4   CASM Simulation of Coupled Model in Simu1ation 1 
 
 
Figure 7-5   Profit Simulation of Coupled Model in Simulation 1 
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Figure 7-6 shows the order simulations in comparison with 35% of world aircraft orders.  
Since no immediate data regarding aircraft orders of the U.S. airlines was available to the author, 
35% of world aircraft orders were assumed as the U.S. orders.  Such ratio was approximated 
from the forecasts in Boeing Current Market Outlook 2003 [15].  To check the reasonableness of 
parameter estimates particularly value of K2, the assumed U.S. orders (35% of world orders) are 
further plotted against prior-year profits in Figure 7-7 as well as the simulation results.  The 
figure shows that when the airlines are profitable, the slope of simulated aircraft orders with 
respect to profits is in the neighborhood of the observed slope from actual data, indicating the 
estimate of K2 – effect of profitability on order aggressiveness is in a reasonable range. 
 
Figure 7-6   Aircraft Order Simulation of Coupled Model in Simulation 1 
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Figure 7-7   Simulation of Effect of Profitability on Aircraft Orders 
 
However, the capacity simulation in Figure 7-2 deviates from the actual data after 2001. So 
is the CASM simulation in Figure 7-4.  Close examinations of simulation set-up found that both 
demand and RASM inputs did not include the effects of the industry crisis in 2001.  Figure 7-8 
illustrate the U.S. scheduled domestic passenger traffic and yield between 1995 and 2004, in 
which aggregate monthly RPM of ATA U.S. member airlines1 are plotted against the aggregate 
yield of eight major U.S. airlines2 due to data availability [16, 17].  The figure indicates that both 
demand and yield decreased significantly after the September 11 event and the effects in 2001 
should not be ignored. 
 
                                                 
1 ATA U.S. member airlines: Aloha, Alaska, America West, American, ATA, Continental, Delta, Hawaiian, JetBlue, 
Midwest, Northwest, Southwest, United, and US Airways 
2 Eight major U.S. airlines: Alaska, American, America West, Continental (incl. Micronesia), Delta, Northwest, 
United, US Airways 
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Figure 7-8   U.S. Scheduled Monthly Domestic Passenger Traffic and Yield [16, 17] 
 
7.3.2 Simulation 2 
Simulation 2, referred as Sim2 below, had the same parameter setting as Sim1 but different 
inputs in order to reflect the changes on the input side due to the industry crisis in 2001.  In order 
to simulate the effects in 2001, in addition to the long-term trends for demand, RASM and 
CASM1 assumed in Sim1, approximately 240 billion ASM drop in demand and 1 cent/ASM 
decrease in RASM in 2001-02 were added to the model to reflect the changes on demand and 
RASM.    The 240 billion ASM drop in demand was obtained by observing the difference 
between the long-term demand trend and actual capacity data after 2001 in Figure 7-2; so was 
the 1 cent/ASM decrease in RASM observed from Figure 7-4.  The model setup for Sim2 is 
shown in Figure 7-9. 
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Figure 7-9   Configuration of Coupled Model for Simulation 2 to Reflect  
Effects in 2001 on Demand and RASM 
 
Figures 7-10 through 7-14 show the simulation results of capacity, fleet size, CASM, profit 
and aircraft orders for Sim2 in comparison with Sim1 results and industry data respectively. 
 
Figure 7-10   Capacity Simulation of Coupled Model in Simulation 2 
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Figure 7-11   Fleet Simulation of Coupled Model in Simulation 2 
 
 
Figure 7-12   CASM Simulation of Coupled Model in Simulation 2 
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Figure 7-13    Profit Simulation of Coupled Model in Simulation 2 
 
 
Figure 7-14   Aircraft Order Simulation of Coupled Model in Simulation 2 
 
Shown in Figure 7-10, even after demand correction, the capacity simulation in Sim2 
differs dramatically from the actual data in 2001-2003.  This indicates that by assuming overall 
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3-year delay between profits and aircraft deliveries, the coupled model explains the industry 
growth trend due to airplane orders reasonably well.  However, such assumption is not true in 
terms of explaining the temporary capacity decrease due to emergency, in which the system can 
respond faster by canceling flights, reducing utilization, parking or retiring aircraft in a short 
term.  Therefore, there exists an asymmetric effect in capacity adjustment, that is, in the up cycle 
the airlines take years of delay to add capacity while in the down cycle the excess operating 
capacity can be effectively withdrawn in a short term by parking aircraft and/or reducing 
utilization.  Shown in Figure 7-15, approximately 450 jet aircraft of the U.S. major, national and 
regional carriers were stored as of May 14, 2003, according to Air Claims data report in Air 
Transport World, July 2003 issue [18].  Since the coupled model did not take into account the 
short-term capacity response, it failed to model the system response after 2001.   
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Figure 7-15   Stored Aircraft of the U.S. Major, National and Regional Carriers [18] 
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Similarly, the CASM simulation in Figure 7-11 failed to model the CASM response after 
2001 either, because the September 11 event was an extreme shock to the industry and the 
system responded faster to the emergency.  Consequently, this led to a shorter delay between 
profits and cost adjustment.  For the future, it is unknown whether this delay will keep short or 
revert to the level before 2001. 
Therefore, the coupled model needs to be modified to include the short-term response in 
capacity and cost adjustment in order to model the effects in 2001. 
 
7.3.3 Simulation 3 
To simulate the short-term capacity response and the shorter delay between profits and cost 
adjustment, the coupled model was modified by: (1) directly pulling out 240-billion ASM 
capacity to reduce the capacity simulation to actual 2001 level; and (2) reducing D3 to 1 year 
after 2001 and reverting it to the original level (3.1 yeas) after 2004 when the industry becomes 
profitable.  The modified coupled model is shown in Figure 7-16.  The model was simulated with 
the same inputs as Sim2.  
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Figure 7-16   Modified Coupled Model for Simulation 3 to Capture Effects in 2001 
 82
Figures 7-17 through 7-21 show the simulation results of capacity, fleet, CASM, profits 
and aircraft orders of the modified coupled model in comparison with Sim1 and industry data 
respectively.  
Seen from Figure 7-19, by shorten the delay between profits and cost adjustment, the 
modified coupled model captures the trend in CASM after 2001 regarding the shorter response 
time in cost adjustment.  Figure 7-20 indicates that industry profits will oscillate exponentially if 
the delay after 2004 kept at the level before 2001. 
 
 
Figure 7-17   Capacity Simulation of Modified Coupled Model in Simulation 3 
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Figure 7-18   Fleet Simulation of Modified Coupled Model in Simulation 3 
 
 
Figure 7-19   CASM Simulation of Modified Coupled Model in Simulation 3 
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Figure 7-20   Profit Simulation of Modified Coupled Model in Simulation 3 
 
 
Figure 7-21   Aircraft Order Simulation of Modified Coupled Model in Simulation 3 
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7.4 Summary of Coupled Model 
A coupled model that combines capacity and cost effects was developed based on previous 
individual capacity and cost models.  The parameters in the coupled model were determined 
from previous results, data examination and calibration.  Simulation results indicate that the 
coupled model captures the long-term industry behavior in profit cyclicality better than the 
individual capacity or cost models developed previously, indicating that the system oscillation 
was driven by the joint effects of capacity and cost adjustment.  However, the model fails to 
reflect the industry response after 2001 because of excluding the short-term effect.  The 
simulation results suggest that the short-term asymmetric effect is important and should be 
included in the model in order to better explain the industry dynamics.  By shorten the delay 
between profits and cost adjustment (D3) after 2001, the modified coupled model captures the 
industry response in CASM after 2001. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Including Load Factor and Short-term Capacity Effects 
 
 
This chapter proposes a more sophisticated model based on previous efforts for future 
research.  The model takes into account effects of price-demand elasticity and load factor on 
demand and short-term effects on operating capacity in order to better explain the dynamics of 
airline industry.  By including more factors, such model is expected to behave more realistic, 
however, with a trade-off of model complexity.  It should be noted that the model is still under 
development, and some concepts and/or sub-models are very preliminary and even debatable. 
 
8.1 Model Including Load Factor and Short-term Capacity Effects 
Figure 8-1 proposes a model that includes load factor and short-term capacity effects.  The 
model is constructed based on the results from previous discussions, and consists of demand, 
capacity and revenue management sub-models.  The demand model considers traffic demand as 
an outcome of GDP, social factors and airfare.  The capacity model takes into account the long-
term fleet planning efforts, short-term tactical scheduling effect, and the asymmetric effect in 
capacity adjustment.  The demand and capacity interacts with each other through the revenue 
management process to generate the industry profit.  Each of these sub-models is to be discussed 
separately below. 
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Figure 8-1   Proposed Model Including Load Factor and Short-term Capacity Effects 
 
8.2 Demand Modeling 
8.2.1 Latent Demand Concept 
A concept of latent demand is proposed in the demand model.  The latent demand is the 
maximum traffic demand that could occur at some price level or free according to current macro 
economy status and social factors.   
Figure 7-8 illustrate the U.S. scheduled domestic passenger traffic and yield between 1995 
and 2004 [16, 17].  The figure shows that significant airfare reduction in 2001 did not boost the 
traffic, indicating that some factors other than yield had determined the maximum demand level 
at that time.  These factors are considered primary due to exogenous macro economy such as 
GDP growth and social factors such as people’s willingness and confidence to air travel.  Figure 
8-2 shows the passenger traffic of the U.S. airlines versus GDP, indicating there is a decrease in 
RPM due to the economic recession and September 11 event [2, 19].  
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Therefore, it is postulated that there exists the latent demand primary driven by the 
economy and social factors, and price is assumed to have short-term effects on demand.   
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Figure 8-2   Scheduled Passenger Traffic of the U.S. Airlines and GDP [2, 19] 
 
8.2.2 Demand Models 
Two preliminary demand models are proposed below based on previous discussions and 
observations.  Figure 8-3 proposes a constant price elasticity demand model, and Figure 8-4 
shows a simple linear demand model.  As illustrated in the figures, the latent demand determines 
the overall demand level in a period, and price only has short-term effects on boosting or 
suppressing the demand in order to materialize demand into traffic.  
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Figure 8-3   Proposed Constant Price Elasticity Demand Model 
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Figure 8-4   Proposed Simple Linear Demand Model 
 
8.3 Revenue Management 
The total traffic of the U.S. airline industry in general has grown during the past two 
decades (Figure 1-1).  Figure 8-5 shows ATA data of the average load factor of the U.S. airlines 
after deregulation, which has gradually increased over the years [2].  However, it is often 
reported that the traffic demand is ‘weak’ or ‘strong’.  This suggests that the ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ 
traffic demand has to be related to the supply (ASM).  Therefore, it is postulated that there exists 
a target load factor as a threshold in airline’s operation.  The traffic is considered ‘weak’ when 
the actual load factor is below the target load factor, or ‘strong’ when the actual load factor is 
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above it.  Pricing is used as a tool in revenue management to adjust the traffic to achieve the 
target load factor, shown in Figure 8-1. 
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Figure 8-5   Passenger Load Factors of the U.S. Airlines of Scheduled Services [2] 
 
8.4 Capacity Modeling 
8.4.1 Two Capacity Concepts 
Two capacity concepts are proposed in the model: potential lift and operating capacity 
(ASM).  The potential lift is the maximum capacity that the system could offer at sustainable 
level.  The operating capacity is the capacity in operation, which is part of potential lift.  As 
discussed in Chapter 7, there exits a short-term capacity effect, indicating that there is a 
difference between the maximum capacity the system could offer and the actual capacity the 
system operates.  Moreover, the short-term capacity effect is often asymmetric in terms of 
different delay times in adding and removing capacity. 
Shown in Figure 8-1, potential lift is considered as the outcome of long-term fleet planning 
and therefore experience long-time delay due to planning time and manufacturing lead-time.  
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Operating capacity (ASM) incorporates the short-term scheduling effects and thus is updated at 
higher frequency and has relatively short delay.  The ratio between capacity and potential lift is 
the utilization rate, indicating the extent to which the potential lift being utilized in operation. 
The two capacity concepts have different cost perspectives.  As proposed in Figure 8-1, the 
fixed costs are driven by the potential lift, while the variable costs are driven by the operating 
capacity. 
 
8.4.2 Tactical Scheduling Model 
The short-term tactical scheduling model takes care of temporal changes in operating 
capacity based on the capacity shortfall in near future.  The capacity shortfall is determined 
based on the mismatch between short-term traffic projection and the capacity that is to be 
available in the planning horizon.  This part of capacity includes current capacity, deliveries and 
retirements or parking in the planning time frame.  Capacity change in scheduling model will 
take relatively short delay due to schedule and advertising announcement.  Profitability may have 
an impact on scheduling because the operating capacity is related to the variable costs. 
It should be pointed out that there’s an asymmetric effect in adding and removing capacity, 
i.e., short-time delay in removing capacity by parking or retiring aircraft versus long-time delay 
in adding capacity by taking new deliveries.  In addition, most capacity in the stored fleet should 
be considered unlikely to return to services in the U.S.  Shown in Figure 7-15, most stored 
aircraft are old and inefficient aircraft such as B727s and old-generation B737s, indicating that 
airlines actively use parking aircraft as a way to upgrade their fleets.  A concept of Fleet 
Restorable Ratio is proposed in the scheduling model; such ratio is always less than 1, implying 
that the stored fleet can not be fully recovered to fulfill the short-term operation need, due to 
 92
mismatches across aircraft types, O-D markets and airlines between the stored fleet and the 
required adjustment.  Consequently, this implies the effective way to add capacity is to take new 
deliveries which requests longer delay time.  
 
8.4.3 Fleet Planning Model 
The planning is based on the long-term fleet projection that is driven by demand.  The 
projection offers a base for the desired long-term fleet.  A concept of Collective Market Share 
Perspective Ratio is proposed in constructing the desired fleet; such ratio is always greater than 
1, as discussed in section 4.6, due to the optimism in capacity projection, aggregate effects of 
individual airlines’ market share projections, the aggressiveness from manufacturers in 
promoting the products, and impacts of exogenous factors. 
Orders are placed based on the difference between the desired fleet and current operating 
fleet, plus the incentive of expansion driven by profits which represents the asymmetric effect 
between profits and orders shown in Figure 4-4. 
 
8.5 Modeling Cost Factors 
Proposed in the model, the costs consist of fixed costs and variable cost.  The fixed costs is 
the costs that are related to the size of the fleet or company, such as ownership costs of flight 
equipment and ground facilities including depreciation and amortization, and general services 
and administrative costs.  This part of costs is not sensitive to daily capacity adjustment, and is 
not closely related to the status of aircraft, i.e., either in service or storage.  It represents the 
essential costs in terms of owning aircraft and facilities. 
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The variable costs are the remaining costs that vary with operating capacity, including 
flight operation costs, maintenance costs, passenger costs, etc.  Since this part of costs varies 
with the operating capacity, it gives airlines flexibility to control the total costs and profits 
through short-term scheduling efforts. 
 
8.6 Summary 
A model including load factor and short-term capacity effects is proposed based on 
previous efforts in an effort to better model the dynamics of airline industry.  The concept of 
latent demand is proposed in the demand model to interpret impacts of economy and social 
factors on overall demand level.  Effect of revenue management is considered by introducing the 
target load factor as a threshold in operation and yield as a tool to adjust traffic in short term. 
The concepts of potential lift and utilization rate are proposed in the capacity model to 
represent the capacity limit the industry could offer and the actual capacity the system operates.  
Scheduling model is proposed to explain the short-term asymmetric capacity effects and offers 
airlines controllability on the total costs in short time.  The concept of Fleet Restorable Ratio is 
proposed to represent the constraints in recovering massive aircraft from storage.  The concept of 
Collective Market Share Perspective Ratio is proposed in fleet planning model to count the 
aggregate effects of optimism, aggressiveness of individual airlines and manufacturers, and 
exogenous factors in developing the system in long term. 
The proposed model sets a foundation for future work.  By including above factors and 
effects, the model is expected to better explain the airline industry dynamics. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Conclusions 
 
 
9.1 Summary of Findings 
This study identified the fundamental cycle periods of the U.S. and world airline industries, 
as well as capacity and cost effects as driving factors of the system behavior.   
Assuming that the industry profit cycles could be modeled as an undamped second-order 
system, the fundamental cycle period was identified to be 11.3 years for the U.S. airlines and 
10.5 years for the world airlines.  Analyses of industry profits reveal that such cycle period is 
endogenous, neither deregulation nor September 11 have significantly changed it.  The net profit 
model is an extremely simple empirical model that does not address causality or constraints and 
offers insight on the profit cyclicality of airline industry; however, care must be taken in 
applying the model to predict future system behavior. 
Parametric models were developed under the hypothesis that phase lag in the system 
caused profit oscillations; and two hypotheses, lag in capacity response and lag in cost 
adjustment were studied. 
A parametric model was developed by hypothesizing the delay in capacity response caused 
profit oscillations.  For this model, the system stability depends on the delay between aircraft 
orders and deliveries and the aggressiveness in airplane ordering.  Assuming industry profits 
correlated to capacity shortfall, the delay and gain were calculated and the results were consistent 
with the observed delay between world aircraft deliveries and net profits.  Since the gain in the 
model has lumped impacts of exogenous factors, exaggerated capacity response was observed in 
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simulation.  This indicates capacity shortfall alone cannot fully explain the industry dynamics.  
The model also indicates reduced delay may help to mitigate system oscillations.   
Similarly, a parametric model was developed by hypothesizing the delay in cost adjustment 
caused profit oscillations, and simulation results were consistent with industry profits.  The 
model identified cost adjustment as another potential driving factor of the system behavior in 
addition to capacity response. 
A coupled model was developed to study the joint effects of capacity and cost.  Simulations 
indicated that the coupled model explained industry dynamics better than the individual capacity 
or cost models, indicating that the system behavior is driven by the joint effects of capacity 
response and cost adjustment.  The model also suggests that short-term and asymmetric capacity 
effects are important and should be included. 
Last, a more sophisticated model including load factor and short-term capacity effects is 
proposed for future work in an effort to better understand the airline industry dynamics. 
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APPENDIX A 
Average Aircraft Utility of the U.S. Airlines 
 
 
The system-wide aircraft utility of the U.S. airlines between 1980 and 2003 recorded by 
DOT Form 41 is shown in Figure A-1 [12].  The aircraft utility is measured in terms of available 
seat-miles per aircraft flown per year, and has the average at 190 million ASM per aircraft per 
year.  The average aircraft utility was used in converting the simulated capacity and aircraft 
orders, both measured in billion ASM in simulation, into fleet size and aircraft orders, measured 
in aircraft units, respectively.   
Average: 190 mil ASM per AC per year
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Figure A-1   System-wide Aircraft Utility of the U.S. Airlines [12] 
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APPENDIX B 
Cost Analysis of the 
U.S. Major and National Passenger Carriers 
 
 
This section analyzes the cost structure of the U.S. major and national passenger carriers.  
Conclusions drawn from the analysis provide the foundation for simulations in Chapters 6 and 7. 
All revenue and cost items in this chapter are evaluated in constant 2000 dollars and are for 
the U.S. major and national passenger carriers.  According to the Department of Transportation, 
majors are the carriers whose annual operating revenues are more than 1 billion dollars; and the 
nationals are those with revenues between 100 million and 1 billion dollars.  The passenger 
revenues of the major and national passenger carries together accounted for approximately 99% 
of the total passenger revenues of the U.S. airline industry after 1990, according to author’s 
calculation based on DOT Form 41 data.  Therefore, the cost structure of the U.S. major and 
national passenger carriers is a sound representation of the cost structure of the U.S. passenger 
services. 
 
B.1 Introduction and Methodology 
Figure B-1 depicts unit passenger revenues and unit operating expenses of the U.S. major 
and national passenger carriers recorded in Form 41 [12].  The unit passenger revenue, 
abbreviated as RASM, is the passenger revenue per ASM; and the unit operating expense is the 
operating expense per ASM.  Shown in Figure B-1, RASM and unit operating expense have 
decreased continuously despite of fluctuations.  This long-term trend is primarily due to market 
competition, entrance of low-cost carriers, advance in technology, introduction of better aircraft, 
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and improvement in operating efficiency.  The operating expense consists of many items; and 
some of them, as shall be discussed below, have weak correlation with the profit.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine the cost components closely to determine the extent to which the profit 
could have impact on. 
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Figure B-1   RASMs and Unit Operating Expenses of the U.S. Major and  
National Passenger Carriers [12] 
 
The operating expenses were constructed by the objective groupings following the 
methodology developed by ATA; and corresponding cost breakdown data in ATA Airline Cost 
Index that were originally from Form 41 were analyzed [14].  Each cost item was carefully 
examined in terms of real value (2000 $), share in unit operating expense, driving factors, and its 
sensitivity to profits.  Since the cost is essentially based on the operation need, profitability is 
considered responsible for the fluctuations of some cost items over the time.  Consequently, the 
cost is classified into two parts: profit-sensitive component and less-profit-sensitive component.  
The share of annual fluctuations of profit-sensitive cost items in unit operating expense is 
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considered as an indicator of the impact of profit on cost; and the share of annual fluctuation in 
1980 is of particular interest for simulation initiation reasons. 
 
B.2 Cost Analysis 
B.2.1 Labor 
Labor cost includes salaries, employee benefits and payroll taxes for general management, 
flight personnel, maintenance labor, aircraft & traffic handling personnel and other personnel.  
Figure B-2 shows the unit labor cost (labor cost per ASM) and its share in unit operating expense 
[14].   
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Figure B-2   Unit Labor Costs of the U.S. Majors and Nationals Passenger Carriers [14] 
 
The unit labor cost decreased from 5.5 cents/ASM in 1980 to 3.5 cents/ASM in 2003.  
However, its share in unit operating expense varied between 32% and 38%, with an average of 
34%.  Profit contributes to the fluctuations in labor costs through contract negotiation: when the 
airline is profitable, labor groups would negotiate with the management for wage raise and 
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benefit improvement; whereas when the airline is in loss, the management would turn to cut the 
package and headcount.  The annual fluctuation in unit labor cost ranged from 0.5-cent/ASM 
reduction in 1984 to 0.2-cent/ASM increase in 2001, corresponding to 3.9% reduction in unit 
operating expense in 1984 and 1.9% increase in 2001 respectively.  The unit labor cost reduced 
by 0.2 cent/ASM from 1979 level to 5.5 cents/ASM in 1980, representing a 1.4% reduction in 
unit operating expense. 
 
B.2.2 Materials Purchased: Fuel, Food and Maintenance Materials 
Items in this category include aircraft fuel, passenger food and beverage, maintenance 
materials, and other materials. 
Figure B-3 shows the aircraft fuel cost per ASM and its share in unit operating expense 
[14].  The unit fuel cost dropped from 4.7 cents/ASM in 1980 to 1.3 cents/ASM in 2003, less 
than 1/3 of the 1980 level.  Correspondingly, the percentage of fuel consumption in unit 
operating expense reduced from nearly 30% in 1980 to 13% in 2003. 
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Figure B-3   Unit Fuel Costs of the U.S. Major and National Passenger Carriers [14] 
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Fuel costs are very sensitive to the jet fuel and crude oil prices.  Figure B-4 depicts the 
historical average jet fuel prices of the U.S. major, national and large regional carriers of all 
services and the crude oil prices over the period, noticing that the annual average jet fuel prices 
instead of monthly data during 1980 and 1985 were plotted due to data availability [20].  As can 
be seen, unit fuel costs in Figure B-3 closely sensed the fluctuations in jet fuel and crude oil 
prices in Figure B-4.  The low fuel prices during the 1990s should be credited to the decreasing 
unit fuel costs in the same period.  Other factors that contributed to the unit fuel cost reduction 
include introduction of more fuel-efficient aircraft and improvement in operations. 
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Figure B-4   Historical Average Jet Fuel Prices of the U.S. Major, National and Large Regional  
Carriers of All Services and Crude Oil Prices [20] 
 
Figure B-5 shows the unit costs of food and beverage [14].  The food costs are driven by 
the revenue passenger traffic.  Starting from the early 1990s, the food costs have been constantly 
decreasing due to the simplification of catering services abroad and the need to compete with 
low-cost carriers. 
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 Seen in Figure B-6, the percentage of unit costs of maintenance materials fluctuated 
between 2% and 3% of unit operating expenses [14].  This part of cost is more relevant to the 
type of aircraft, age of fleet and aircraft operation hours. 
Cost of Food & Beverage per ASM
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
20
00
 c
en
ts
/A
S
M
0
1
2
3
4
5
%
2000 cents/ASM (L) % (R)
 
Figure B-5   Unit Costs of Food and Beverage of the U.S. Major and National  
Passenger Carriers [14] 
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Figure B-6   Unit Costs of Maintenance Materials of the U.S. Major and National  
Passenger Carriers [14] 
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Therefore, fuel, food and beverage, and maintenance materials are not considered as cost 
components that are sensitive to the airline profits. 
 
B.2.3 Aircraft Ownership and Non-Aircraft Ownership 
Figure B-7 depicts aircraft ownership costs, which include the costs for aircraft rentals, 
depreciation of airframes, aircraft engines, airframe parts, aircraft engine parts and other flight 
equipment, and amortization expenses and capital leases [14].  The share of aircraft ownership 
cost in operating expense more than doubled over the past two decades, growing from 4.5% in 
1980 to 10% in 2003.  Figure B-8 shows the non-aircraft ownership costs, which include the 
rental costs for facilities other than flight equipment and parts plus depreciation and amortization 
expenses [14].  Again, the share of non-aircraft ownership cost doubled from 2.6% in 1980 to 
5.3% in 2003.  Collectively, the ownership costs accounted for more than 15% in 2003, twice the 
level in 1980. 
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Figure B-7   Unit Costs of Aircraft Ownership of the U.S. Major and National  
Passenger Carriers [14] 
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The increasing ownership costs were largely due to airlines’ expansion in fleet, network, 
operations and services, which often came with capacity increase, either fleet or ground facilities.  
Profits were considered responsible for the increase in ownership costs.  The annual fluctuation 
in ownership costs accounted for 0.42 cent/ASM or 2.7% of unit operating expense in 1980. 
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Figure B-8   Unit Costs of Non-Aircraft Ownership of the U.S. Major and National  
Passenger Carriers [14] 
 
B.2.4 Landing Fees 
Seen in Figure B-9, the unit costs of landing fees varied around 2% of unit operating 
expenses between 1980 and 2003 [14].  The landing fees are charged based on the number of 
revenue departures and available tons each departure.  The annual fluctuation of landing fees 
varies from –0.1% to 0.1% of unit operating expense during the period analyzed except 2002 
which was 0.2%.  Therefore, the possible profit impact on landing fees was ignored. 
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Figure B-9   Unit Costs of Landing Fees of the U.S. Major and National Passenger Carriers [14] 
 
B.2.5 Services Purchased 
Cost components in this category include professional services, passenger commission, 
advertising and promotions, communications, insurance, and other services.   
Figure B-10 shows the unit costs of professional services including outside maintenance 
[14].  The share of professional services increased from less than 2% of operating expense in 
1980 to more than 9% in the late 1990s, largely due to the capacity growth and the industrial 
trend of increasing outsourcing. 
Figure B-11 and B-12 illustrate the commission costs and the advertising and promotion 
costs respectively [14].  Both items are driven by the revenue passenger traffic and have 
decreasing shares; especially the share of commission cost dropped approximately 9.5% in ten 
years, from 11.2% in 1993 to 1.7% in 2003.  The decreasing commission and promotion costs 
could attribute to the boom of Internet and the increasing popularity of web-based computer 
reservation system (CRS) during the period. 
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Figure B-10   Unit Costs of Professional Services of the U.S. Major and National  
Passenger Carriers [14] 
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Figure B-11   Unit Costs of Passenger Commission of the U.S. Major and National  
Passenger Carriers [14] 
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Figure B-12   Unit Costs of Advertising and Promotion of the U.S. Major and National  
Passenger Carriers [14] 
 
Figure B-13 and B-14 depict the unit costs for aircraft insurance and non-aircraft insurance 
respectively [14].  The aircraft insurance charge is based on the hull net book value that is related 
to the fleet age, while the non-aircraft insurance is related to the revenue passenger traffic.  Seen 
in Figure B-14, the non-aircraft insurance increased from 0.4% in 2001 to more than 1% due to 
changes in insurance policy after the September 11 event.  The two insurance components 
collectively accounted for at most 1.6% of unit operating expense; therefore, profit impact on 
insurance was ignored. 
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Figure B-13   Unit Costs of Aircraft Insurance of the U.S. Major and National 
Passenger Carriers [14] 
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Figure B-14   Unit Costs of Non-Aircraft Insurance of the U.S. Major and National  
Passenger Carriers [14] 
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B.2.6 Summary of Cost Analysis 
Overall, the unit operating expense has decreased over the period analyzed.  This long-term 
trend is credited to competition, low-cost carrier prosperity, plus improvement in technology and 
operation.  Such long-term decreasing trend is likely to continue in the future.   
The cost allocations in 1980, 2000 and 2003 are shown in Figures 7-15 through 7-17 to 
illustrate the cost structure of the U.S. major and national passenger carriers at the stage of early 
deregulation, after deregulation and after the effects in 2001 [14].  Seen from the figures, labor 
remains the largest single cost item through the years, accounting for more than one third of unit 
operating expense.  Fuel and commission costs have been through significant reductions in terms 
of share distribution over the period, while professional services, aircraft ownership and non-
aircraft ownership are among the items experiencing most increases. 
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Figure B-15   Cost Allocation of the U.S. Major and National Passenger Carriers in 1980 [14] 
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Cost Allocation: 2000
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Figure B-16     Cost Allocation of the U.S. Major and National Passenger Carriers in 2000 [14] 
 
Cost Allocation: 2003
U.S. Major and National Passenger Carriers
Other
19.6%
Labor
35.6%
Fuel
13.3%
Commission
1.7%
Maintenance 
Materials
1.7%
Landing Fees
2.3%
Food
2.1%
Professional 
Services
8.4%
Non-AC 
Ow nership
5.3%
AC Ow nership
10.0%
 
Figure B-17     Cost Allocation of the U.S. Major and National Passenger Carriers in 2003 [14] 
 
Profitability is considered to have impact on the fluctuations in labor, aircraft ownership 
and non-aircraft ownership costs.  The unit costs of labor and aircraft/non-aircraft ownership 
amount on average 47% of unit operating expense.  The annual fluctuations in labor cost and 
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aircraft/non-aircraft ownership costs accounted for 4.1% of unit operating expense in 1980, of 
which, 1.7% was due to labor and 2.4% due to ownership.   This ratio was used to assess the 
initial value of CASM2, to be discussed below, for the simulation in Chapter 6. 
  
B.3 Cost Adjustment 
Seen in Figure B-1, the unit operating expense is always higher than RASM.  This is 
because the total operating expense combines the expenses within one airline from different 
operations, such as passenger, cargo and hotel business, whereas RASM is a revenue 
measurement exclusively for passenger services.  Therefore, direct comparison between RASM 
and unit operating expense is of little sense.  Adjustment on unit operating expense is essential in 
order to make fair comparison between RASM and unit operating expense. 
The unit operating expense was adjusted through prorating.  Figure B-18 shows the shares 
of passenger revenues in total operating revenues of the U.S. major and national passenger 
carriers, based on DOT Form 41 data [12].  The average share was about 88% between 1980 and 
2003, despite of 83% in 2003.  Assuming operating expenses had the same distribution across 
the business units as operating revenues, the unit operating expense regarding passenger services 
was adjusted by prorating.  The unit operating expense after adjustment with respect to passenger 
services is defined as CASM in this study and is shown in Figure B-19 and Figure 6-1. 
CASM is split into two components: CASM1 and CASM2; where CASM2 represents the 
profit-sensitive component of CASM including fluctuations in labor and aircraft/non-aircraft 
ownership costs, and CASM1 is less sensitive to profits.  Based on previous cost analysis results, 
the initial value of CASM2 was assumed as 4.1% of CASM in 1980 for the simulation in 
Chapter 6, and the initial value of CASM1 was thus approximately 96% of CASM then. 
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Figure B-18   Share of Passenger Revenues in Total Operating Revenues of the  
U.S. Major and National Passenger Carriers [12] 
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Figure B-19   RASM and CASM of the U.S. Major and National Passenger Carriers 
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